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Abstract The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), agreed in 2014
and transposed into national law by now, equipped EU resolution authorities with a
number of tools and powers to deal with EU failing institutions. To use these tools
and powers, and to act swiftly prior to institutions reaching the state of insolvency,
resolution authorities must undertake appropriate planning (resolution planning) in
accordance with a number of rules and processes under the Directive.
Resolution planning should enable authorities to “handle situations involving both
systemic crises and failures of individual institutions”. The resolution plan must take
into consideration the resolution scenarios “including that the event of failure may be
idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or system wide
events”. The protection of financial stability has a central place in the BRRD, albeit in
some instances it should also be balanced against other considerations, for example
the other ‘resolution objectives’. The term ‘financial stability’ is not defined in the
Directive; it is further qualified, however, in the context of a number of assessments
that the resolution authorities must undertake.
The paper discusses the notion of ‘financial stability’ through the lenses of a num-
ber of tasks that EU resolution authorities must perform. It argues that although the
financial stability objective should be necessarily broad to provide discretion to reso-
lution authorities, it is hard to ensure consistency in resolution decisions and actions.
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1 Introduction
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD),1 agreed in 2014 and trans-
posed into national law by now,2 equipped EU resolution authorities with a number
of tools and powers to deal with EU failing institutions.3 To use these tools and pow-
ers, and to act swiftly prior to institutions reaching the state of insolvency,4 resolution
authorities must undertake appropriate planning (resolution planning) in accordance
with a number of rules and processes under the Directive. In conducting resolution
planning, resolution authorities may require institutions to assist them by for exam-
ple drawing up a draft resolution plan or preparing a draft update of the existing
resolution plan.5 In either case, the ultimate responsibility rests with the resolution
authorities who own the planning process and should ensure its smooth functioning.
Resolution planning should enable authorities to “handle situations involving both
systemic crises and failures of individual institutions”.6 The resolution plan must take
into consideration the resolution scenarios “including that the event of failure may be
idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or system wide
events”.7 The protection of financial stability has a central place in the BRRD, albeit
in some instances it should also be balanced against other considerations, for example
the other ‘resolution objectives’.8 The resolution objectives are to:
(a) ensure the continuity of critical functions;
(b) avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system;
(c) protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial sup-
port;
(d) protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU (DGSD)9 and investors cov-
ered by Directive 97/9/EC;10 and
(e) protect client funds and client assets.
The resolution objectives underpin all decisions in resolution-from preparation
to application. Resolution authorities should have regard to these objectives when:
1Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing
a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amend-
ing Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC,
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU)
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council [2014] OJ L 173/190.
2The transposition deadline was 31 December 2014 (Article 130 (1) of the BRRD).
3For the purposes of this paper, ‘institutions’ means all of the individual entities as well as groups captured
by the BRRD as defined in Art. 1 (1).
4Resolution authorities will trigger resolution when the institution is “failing or is likely to fail” (Art. 32
(1) (a) of the BRRD) with a view to preserving the institution’s value and minimising the cost of resolution.
5Art. 10 (5) of the BRRD.
6Recital 6 to the BRRD.
7Art. 10 (3) of the BRRD.
8Art. 31 of the BRRD.
9Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guar-
antee schemes [2014] OJ L 173/149.
10Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-
compensation schemes [1997] OJ L 84/22.
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shaping their resources and operational capacity;11 deciding on whether to legislate
for additional resolution tools and powers;12 assessing the resolvability of an institu-
tion;13 triggering resolution;14 managing the institution under resolution;15 deciding
whether to exercise control over the institution under resolution when taking reso-
lution actions;16 considering whether to take resolution actions that have not been
contemplated in the resolution plan;17 applying the resolution tools and powers;18
marketing the assets, rights, liabilities, shares or other instruments of ownership of the
institution under resolution;19 authorising the bridge institution;20 exempting mort-
gage credit institutions from the application of the minimum requirement for own
funds and eligible liabilities (MREL);21 setting the MREL;22 writing down or con-
verting Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments;23 considering whether to extend the
deadline for the preparation of the business reorganisation plan;24 exercising ancil-
lary powers;25 using the financing arrangements;26 refusing to recognise and enforce
third-country resolution proceedings;27 and taking independent action in relation to
a Union branch.28
The term ‘financial stability’ is not defined in the Directive; it is further qualified,
however, in the context of a number of assessments that the resolution authorities
must undertake. For example, as one of the resolution objectives that resolution au-
thorities should have regard to when choosing and applying the resolution tools, and
exercising the resolution powers, ‘financial stability’ is achieved “in particular by
preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market
discipline”.29 Equally, the scope of ‘financial stability’ is further specified in that res-
olution authorities must take into account “the potential impact of the decision in all
the Member States where the institution or the group operates and minimise the neg-
ative effects on financial stability and negative economic and social effects in those
11Art. 3 (8) of the BRRD.
12Art. 37 (9) of the BRRD.
13S. C (21) and (24) of the Annex to the BRRD.
14Art. 32 (5) of the BRRD.
15Art. 34 (1) (c) and 35 (3) of the BRRD.
16Art. 72 (3) of the BRRD.
17Arts. 87 (j), 91 (6) (a) and 92 (2) (a) of the BRRD.
18Arts. 31 (1) and 91 (6) (b) of the BRRD.
19Art. 39 (3) of the BRRD.
20Art. 41 (1) of the BRRD.
21Art. 45 (3) (b) of the BRRD.
22Art. 45 (6) (a) of the BRRD.
23Arts. 60 (1) (b) and 60 (1) (c) of the BRRD.
24Art. 52 (3) of the BRRD.
25Art. 64 (2) of the BRRD.
26Art. 100 (1) of the BRRD.
27Art. 95 (b) of the BRRD.
28Art. 96 (3) of the BRRD.
29Art. 31 (2) (b) of the BRRD.
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Member States”.30 Therefore, in addition to domestic financial stability, resolution
authorities should consider financial stability in all other Member States; in case of
a conflict, domestic financial stability would presumably take precedent although the
BRRD is silent on this issue. The wording of the relevant provision (i.e. “minimise
the negative effects”) could imply that a limited degree of negative impact on other
Member States’ financial stability could be acceptable.
In relation to third countries, the BRRD is clear that domestic financial stability
and financial stability in other Member States take precedent. In other words, resolu-
tion authorities have the right to refuse to recognise or enforce third-country resolu-
tion proceedings if they consider that the third-country resolution proceedings would
have adverse effects on domestic financial stability or financial stability in another
Member State.31 The UK legislation is an interesting example where the legislator
has gone beyond the BRRD to require the resolution authority, the Bank of England,
to have regard to the potential effect of the exercise of the stabilisation powers32 on
the financial stability of third countries (particularly those third countries in which
any member of the banking group is operating).33
The paper discusses the notion of financial stability through the lenses of a num-
ber of tasks that EU resolution authorities must undertake under the BRRD. It argues
that although the financial stability objective should be necessarily broad to provide
discretion to resolution authorities, it is hard to ensure consistency in resolution deci-
sions and actions.
2 ‘Financial Stability’ in the context of resolution planning and
resolution execution
2.1 Division of authorities’ responsibilities and use of public funds
The BRRD introduces a number of obligations (and powers) falling upon, in most
cases, the resolution authorities and, in some aspects, the supervisory authorities, the
latter primarily being the case in the context of recovery planning and early inter-
vention measures.34 Within Member States, the resolution and supervisory respon-
sibilities must be structurally separated, that is there should be two separate bodies
performing these roles, to ensure operational independence and avoid conflicts of in-
terest.35 The Directive does not go as far as to rule out the possibility of having both
functions within the same entity; so long as the staff involved in carrying out the res-
olution and supervisory functions are structurally separated and subject to separate
reporting lines, Member States are free to decide on the remainder of the organi-
sational arrangements. At the same time, resolution and supervisory authorities are
30Art. 3 (7) of the BRRD.
31Art. 95 (a) of the BRRD.
32Under the UK Special Resolution Regime the resolution tools are called ‘stabilisation options’.
33S. 7A (2) (c) of the Banking Act 2009.
34The BRRD also introduces a number of obligations falling upon institutions within scope.
35Art. 3 (3) of the BRRD.
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subject to exchange of information and cooperation obligations in the preparation,
planning and application of recovery, early intervention and resolution decisions.36
This structural separation is a fundamental concept in the BRRD, which aims at pre-
venting regulatory forbearance while promoting accountability as it acts as a system
of ‘checks and balances’ for both functions.
Exceptionally, the BRRD reserves some obligations (and powers) for the compe-
tent ministry (in most cases this will be the ministry of finance) or the government.
In particular:
(1) Where extraordinary public financial support is provided through the application
of the public equity support tool or the temporary public ownership tool (the
so called ‘government financial stabilisation tools’), the ministry of finance or
the government will take the lead in consultation with the resolution authority.37
These tools can only be used in the very extraordinary situation of a systemic
crisis as a last resort “after having assessed and exploited the other resolution
tools to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability”
and are subject to specific conditions set out in Article 56 (4) and Article 37 (10)
of the Directive.
It is notable that the conditions for use of the government financial stabilisation
tools explicitly refer to one of the resolution objectives, that is the preservation of
financial stability. Financial stability therefore takes precedence over the other res-
olution objectives in the determination of whether the conditions for use of public
funds have been met.
(2) Separately, the resolution authority must inform the ministry of finance of all
the decisions pursuant to the Directive and, unless otherwise laid down in na-
tional law, seek its approval before implementing decisions that have “a direct
fiscal impact or systemic implications”.38 For the cases where the resolution au-
thority is the same entity as the ministry of finance (this is possible given that
the resolution authority can be any public administrative authority or authority
entrusted with public administrative powers),39 as above, there must be a struc-
tural separation between the resolution functions and the other functions of the
ministry of finance. In this case, it will arguably be more challenging for the ap-
proval requirement to be fulfilled by a separate function, especially where there
is internally a common ultimate decision-making body for both functions.
Another important element of this provision is that there is flexibility to amend
the approval requirement under national law (i.e. “unless otherwise laid down in na-
tional law”). In other words, Member States may choose not to require the resolution
authority to seek approval by the ministry of finance or may introduce a different
process to the same or different effect.
In the above two cases, the government or ministry of finance intervention is trig-
gered by the necessity to use public funds. In the first case this necessity leads to
36Art. 3 (4) of the BRRD.
37Art. 56 of the BRRD.
38Art. 3 (6) of the BRRD.
39Art. 3 (2) of the BRRD.
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the application of the government financial stabilisation tools, while in the second it
presumably leads to the use of the resolution fund or the deposit guarantee scheme
fund, hence having a “direct fiscal impact or systemic implications”. The fiscal im-
pact and systemic implications will potentially be caused by the need to use public
funds in the form of the resolution and deposit guarantee funds, and even as a back-
stop for those funds. A funding backstop will be necessary where the resolution or
deposit guarantee fund has not reached the required target level under the BRRD40
and DGSD,41 respectively, or has reached the target level but is still insufficient to
address the extent of losses.
It is unclear in the BRRD and DGSD whether the use of resolution or deposit
guarantee funds is regarded as use of public funds, notwithstanding both funds are
privately funded by the institutions that fall within scope of the Directives on the
basis of ex ante risk-based contributions. For example, Article 10 (3) (a) of the BRRD
refers to “any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing
arrangements established in accordance with Article 100” (the so called ‘resolution
fund’), hence potentially implying that the use of the resolution fund would normally
amount to public financial support. In contrast, recital 55 to the BRRD distinguishes
between “the use of extraordinary public financial support, resolution funds or deposit
guarantee schemes”, but provides that in all these cases such use should be compliant
with the EU State aid framework, hence pointing to the conclusion that the use of
resolution or deposit guarantee fund receives the same treatment as public funds.
This is also the case in the European Commission Banking Communication42 where
it is contemplated that the use of deposit guarantee funds or similar funds to assist in
the restructuring of credit institutions may constitute State aid: “Whilst the funds in
question may derive from the private sector, they may constitute aid to the extent that
they come within the control of the State and the decision as to the funds’ application
is imputable to the State. The Commission will assess the compatibility of State aid
in the form of such interventions under this Communication. State aid in the form
of interventions by a resolution fund will be assessed under this Communication in
order to assess its compatibility with the internal market”.43
Systemic implications may also emerge from the resolution of a systemically im-
portant institution or the resolutions of more than one (systemic or not) institution,
irrespective of whether the funding available is sufficient to cover losses or there is a
need to resort to public funds. The BRRD does not elaborate further on how severe
the systemic implications should be but potentially they do not have to be as severe as
a systemic crisis. Were they to be as severe as a systemic crisis, the legislator would
have presumably spelled it out, not least because ‘systemic crisis’ is a defined term
in the BRRD. In particular, Article 2 (1) (30) of the BRRD defines ‘systemic crisis’
as “a disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative
40Art. 102 of the BRRD.
41Art. 10 of the DGSD.
42Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’)
[2013] OJ C 216/1.
43Paras. 63 and 64 of the Banking Communication.
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consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types of financial
intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially systemically important
to some degree.” In light of the broad definition of a ‘systemic crisis’, one may well
conclude that any resolution with even a limited degree of impact on any part of
the financial system, including the institution under resolution which is a financial
intermediary in itself, could have systemic implications (which will not necessarily
amount to a systemic crisis if there are no “serious negative consequences”), hence
triggering the requirement for approval of the resolution authority’s decisions by the
ministry of finance.
2.2 Simplified obligations, public interest and resolvability assessment
Resolution authorities, in consultation with supervisory authorities, must draw up
individual resolution plans for all institutions within their jurisdiction that are in scope
of the BRRD.44 Banking and investment firm groups are subject to group resolution
plans which are drawn up by all relevant resolution authorities, in consultation with
the relevant supervisory authorities, under the leadership of the resolution authority
that is responsible for the EU parent undertaking.45
Prior to embarking on resolution planning, resolution authorities should decide
whether there is a need for a full or a ‘simplified’ plan. For a simplified plan to be ap-
plicable, resolution authorities must assess whether the institution is eligible for such
simplification on the basis of the impact of its failure. If the failure of the institu-
tion and its subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings “would be
likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, on other institutions,
on funding conditions, or on the wider economy”, resolution authorities must con-
clude that the institution is ineligible for a simplified plan. To assess the impact of the
institution, resolution authorities must have regard to a number of criteria set out in
Article 4 (1) of the BRRD (e.g. size, interconnectedness, complexity of activities, risk
profile etc). It follows that the more significant the impact of the institution’s failure,
the more detailed the resolution plan should be. Most importantly, the more signifi-
cant the impact of the institution’s failure, the more likely resolution, as opposed to
normal insolvency, to be appropriate for dealing with the institution’s failure.
The contents of a full resolution plan are set out in Article 10 (7) of the BRRD: for
example, a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be
legally and economically separated from other functions to ensure continuity, an ex-
planation of how the resolution options could be financed, and a detailed description
of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different
possible scenarios. Resolution authorities do not have discretion on whether to reduce
those contents. However, taking account of the characteristics of the institution and
the resolution scenarios envisaged,46 resolution authorities may specify in the resolu-
tion plan more or less detail (and accordingly adjust their information requests to the
institutions47). For instance, one may expect a more extensive plan for an institution
44Art. 10 (1) of the BRRD.
45Art. 12 of the BRRD.
46Art. 10(3) of the BRRD.
47Art. 11 of the BRRD.
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where it is envisaged that the bail-in tool may be applied than for an institution which
would be resolved by the application of the transfer powers to a narrow part of its
business. The BRRD leaves room for such flexibility because it prescribes only con-
tents requirements for resolution plans but the details to be presented are not further
specified (e.g. compared to the reporting framework under the Capital Requirements
Regulation48/Capital Requirements Directive49 where, in order to provide for a more
proportionate approach, legislative changes would be necessary in view of the degree
of specification in legislative instruments). For those institutions that are subject to
a simplified plan, both the contents and details of resolution plans can be reduced,
and information requests to the institutions can be calibrated accordingly. The BRRD
does not specify the scope of simplifications and resolution authorities are therefore
free to define it; a simplified or proportionate plan cannot, however, extend so far as
to waive the requirement for resolution planning imposed upon resolution authorities.
In the context of the simplified obligations eligibility assessment, resolution au-
thorities must assess whether the impact of the institution’s failure would be likely
to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, other institutions, funding
conditions and the wider economy. A question that arises is whether the assessment
of the institution’s impact on financial markets, other institutions and funding condi-
tions is different from the assessment of the impact of the institution’s failure on the
‘financial system’. The latter consideration is integral to the assessment of the resolu-
tion objectives: one of the resolution objectives is to avoid a significant adverse effect
on the financial system. If the conclusion is that the two assessments are not dissimi-
lar, then they should inform and be consistent with each other. Whilst the simplified
obligations assessment addresses the question of whether an institution is eligible for
a simplified plan or not, the resolution objectives have a broader impact on a number
of decisions and actions under the BRRD, as explained above. First and foremost, the
resolution objectives shape the strategy that the resolution authorities will follow to
resolve the failing institution (‘resolution strategy’). In particular, during the planning
phase and upon entry into resolution, the resolution objectives will guide resolution
authorities through determining whether resolution, compared to normal insolvency,
would be in the public interest.50 If resolution authorities conclude that resolution
would be in the public interest, they should decide on their subsequent actions hav-
ing regard to the resolution objectives; for example, how the resolution tools will be
applied to the institution’s business, including what parts of the business will be left
behind in a partial transfer, to what extent creditors will be affected by the bail-in etc.
The outcome of the public interest test may change between planning and execu-
tion depending on the circumstances at the time of the institution’s failure, although
the BRRD provides that, as a general principle pertaining to cross-border group res-
48Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on pruden-
tial requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
[2013] OJ L 176/1.
49Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment
firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L
176/338.
50Art. 32 (5) of the BRRD.
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olutions, resolution authorities should take into account and follow the group resolu-
tion plans, unless they consider that a different course of action would be appropri-
ate.51 It is noteworthy that the same principle has not been reiterated in the context
of the individual plans applicable to individual institutions. The explanation may be
that in the case of individual institutions, resolution authorities have more flexibility
to depart from the resolution plan given that the plan is not subject to a joint deci-
sion taken by all the relevant authorities that are members of the resolution college.
Equally, there is no requirement for the resolution authorities to prepare a resolution
scheme when it comes to the resolution of an institution that is not member of a group
operating across borders. However, in view of the resolution authorities’ obligation
to disclose a summary of the key elements of the resolution plan to the institution
concerned,52 any departure from the original plan and the legitimate expectations
created thereunder should be treated with caution and be duly justified taking into
account the resolution objectives. Most importantly, on the basis of the original plan,
resolution authorities will have identified any material impediments to the institu-
tion’s resolvability and, where necessary and proportionate, taken relevant actions to
address those impediments.53
The decision of whether resolution would be in the public interest, or in other
words whether resolution or insolvency would be the preferred resolution strategy,
is informed by the resolvability assessment, which resolution authorities must under-
take for each institution as part of the resolution planning process.54 The Commission
Delegated Regulation 2016/107555 sets out four consecutive stages for the resolvabil-
ity assessment:
(a) assessment of the feasibility and credibility of the liquidation of the institution
under normal insolvency proceedings;
(b) selection of a preferred resolution strategy;
(c) assessment of the feasibility of the selected resolution strategy; and
(d) assessment of the credibility of the selected resolution strategy.
Resolution authorities will only complete stage one and not move on to the re-
mainder of the stages, if they conclude that liquidation under normal insolvency
proceedings would be feasible and credible. To assess the credibility of liquidation,
resolution authorities must consider the likely impact of the liquidation on the fi-
nancial systems of any Member State and the EU. To do that, resolution authorities
must assess whether liquidation would be likely to have a material adverse impact
51Art. 87 (j) of the BRRD.
52Art. 10 (1) of the BRRD.
53Art. 10 (2) of the BRRD.
54Art. 15 of the BRRD.
55Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 of 23 March 2016 supplementing Directive
2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards
specifying the content of recovery plans, resolution plans and group resolution plans, the minimum criteria
that the competent authority is to assess as regards recovery plans and group recovery plans, the condi-
tions for group financial support, the requirements for independent valuers, the contractual recognition of
write-down and conversion powers, the procedures and contents of notification requirements and of notice
of suspension and the operational functioning of the resolution colleges [2016] OJ L 184/1.
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on financial market functioning and market confidence; on FMIs; on other financial
institutions; and on the real economy and in particular the availability of critical fi-
nancial services.56 To assess the feasibility of liquidation, resolution authorities must
assess whether it would be feasible for the DGS to timely reimburse covered depos-
itors taking account of the institution’s systems’ capabilities (e.g. ability to provide
necessary information and distinguish between covered and non-covered balances on
deposit accounts).57
Where a resolution authority concludes that it may not be feasible or credible to
wind up the institution under normal insolvency proceedings, or that resolution ac-
tion may otherwise be necessary in the public interest because winding up under
normal insolvency proceedings would not meet the resolution objectives to the same
extent, it must identify a preferred resolution strategy which is appropriate for the
institution. To the extent necessary, it must also identify variant strategies to address
circumstances in which the strategy would not be feasible or credible.58 To assess
the feasibility of the selected resolution strategy, resolution authorities must consider
whether there are potential impediments to resolution related to at least the following
categories: structure and operations, financial resources, information, cross-border
issues, and legal issues.59 Resolution authorities must then assess the credibility of
the selected resolution strategy taking into consideration the likely impact of reso-
lution on the financial systems and real economies of any Member State or of the
EU, with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the
institution.60 For this purpose, resolution authorities must assess whether implemen-
tation of the resolution strategy would be likely to have a material adverse impact on
financial market functioning and in particular market confidence; on FMIs; on other
institutions; and on the real economy and in particular on the availability of financial
services.61
‘Critical functions’ is a term widely used in the BRRD, not least because it is one
of the resolution objectives (i.e. “to ensure the continuity of critical functions”62).
‘Critical functions’ is defined as the “activities, services or operations the discontin-
uance of which is likely in one or more Member States, to lead to the disruption of
services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability due to
the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-
border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutabil-
ity of those activities, services or operations”. These functions may involve activities
such as deposit-taking, payments, clearing, settlement and custody; the BRRD does
not set out a list of critical functions and it is within the resolution authorities’ dis-
cretion to identify those functions on a case by case basis as part of the resolution
planning. It is noteworthy that resolution authorities should identify the institution’s
56Art. 24 (2) of the Delegated Regulation.
57Art. 24 (3) of the Delegated Regulation.
58Art. 23 (3) of the Delegated Regulation.
59Art. 26 of the Delegated Regulation.
60Art. 32 (1) of the Delegated Regulation.
61Art. 32 (2) of the Delegated Regulation.
62Art. 31 (2) (a) of the BRRD.
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critical functions taking account of the potential disruption to the real economy and
financial stability, which in effect creates a link between the resolution objective of
financial stability and that of continuity of critical functions.
From the above analysis it follows that resolution authorities are required to con-
duct parallel assessments in all of the three contexts: simplified obligations eligibility
assessment, public interest test and resolvability assessment. A resolution authority
may well reach the following conclusions in relation to an institution: (1) simplified
obligations are not appropriate because the impact of the institution’s failure would
be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, on other institu-
tions, on funding conditions, or on the wider economy; (2) it would not be feasible
to liquidate the institution under normal insolvency proceedings because liquidation
would be likely to have a material adverse impact on financial market functioning
and market confidence, FMIs, other financial institutions or the real economy; and
(3) resolution action would be necessary in the public interest to meet the resolution
objectives, which include avoiding a significant adverse effect on the financial sys-
tem, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and
by maintaining market discipline.
However, given that the BRRD does not elaborate further on how these three as-
sessments interact with each other, there is nothing preventing resolution authorities
from reaching the following conclusions in relation to an institution: (1) simplified
obligations are appropriate because the impact of the institution’s failure would not
be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, on other institu-
tions, on funding conditions, or on the wider economy; (2) it would not be feasible
to liquidate the institution under normal insolvency proceedings because liquidation
would be likely to have a material adverse impact on financial market functioning
and market confidence, FMIs, other financial institutions or the real economy; and
(3) resolution action would be necessary in the public interest to meet the resolution
objectives, which include avoiding a significant adverse effect on the financial sys-
tem, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by
maintaining market discipline. The risk from the above conclusions would amount to
having a simplified plan for an institution that would enter resolution upon its failure.
A simplified plan may fail to ensure that resolution planning is conducted in a proper
manner, in a manner that would not undermine the resolution authority’s capacity to
take resolution actions under different possible resolution scenarios.
2.3 ‘Financial stability’ in recent resolution cases
Delving into some of the recent resolution cases, the foregoing potential inconsis-
tency in interpreting the impact of an institution’s failure on financial stability re-
ceives no guidance:
(A) HETA Asset Resolution AG (HETA) was an asset management vehicle falling
within the scope of the Austrian law transposing the BRRD (Federal Act on the
Recovery and Resolution of Banks (BaSAG)),63 which was resolved in March
63The Federal Act on the Recovery and Resolution of Banks goes beyond the scope of the BRRD in that
it captures other types of financial institutions in addition to those captured by the BRRD. Those captured
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2015 through the application of the bail-in tool. HETA had been established in
2014 as a ‘wind-down entity’ to ensure that the remainder of Hypo Alpe-Adria-
Bank International AG (HBInt)- the parent company of Hypo Group Alpe Adria
(HGAA)-would be liquidated in an orderly manner over a reasonable period
of time via the sale of its viable assets and wind-down of the residual part. In
view of its wind-down objective, HETA performed limited banking and leasing
activities, for example providing staff, IT, and access to its Continuous Linked
Settlement system, and acting as counterparty to other entities of the group in
derivative transactions.
Notwithstanding that limited activity, the Austrian resolution authority concluded
that HETA’s resolution was in the public interest on the basis of the essential services
provided by HETA to the other entities of the group, and the likely negative effects of
its liquidation on domestic financial stability as well as on financial stability in Croa-
tia and Slovenia. Additionally, given that some of HETA’s liabilities were guaranteed
by the State of Carinthia, the resolution objective of protecting public funds would
be better achieved through resolution compared to risking the State of Carinthia also
becoming insolvent. In terms of size, as of 1 March 2015, HETA’s assets were valued
at EUR 9.6 billion and its liabilities at EUR 17.6 billion.64
(B) Andelskassen J.A.K Slagelse (Andelskassen) was a Danish cooperative bank,
which provided retail and private banking products and services as well as pen-
sions, insurance and investment funds products to its members. It was the 69th
largest bank in Denmark by total assets and as of 2015, its total assets amounted
to 306,41 mln DKK, rendering the bank with a market share of 0.00%. Among
the cooperative banks, it was the 6th largest, out of 9, with a market share of
1.93%. Notwithstanding the bank’s small relative size, the Finansiel Stabilitet, as
the Danish resolution authority, determined that the resolution of Andelskassen
was in the public interest to allow its critical functions to continue, and protect
depositors and client funds.
Andelskassen was the first resolution case under the BRRD in Denmark and was
conducted through the application of the bail-in tool in conjunction with the bridge
bank tool. A notable aspect of the resolution was that it, among others, affected
uninsured-by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme-depositors. The bridge bank that was
set up as part of the resolution process was wholly owned by the Danish financing
arrangements (‘resolution fund’), which contributed to the capitalisation of the bridge
bank. In the absence of a private purchaser for the sale of the bridge bank, the bridge
bank was eventually wound up.65
(C) In November 2015, four Italian banks, which were already under special admin-
istration, were resolved under the legal framework transposing the BRRD into
national law. After absorbing part of the losses with equity and subordinated
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debt, the four banks were split into a ‘good’ bridge bank each and one single
‘bad’ bank (asset management vehicle) where all of the bad quality assets and li-
abilities (especially the non-performing loans) were transferred. It is noteworthy
that the resolution of the four banks brought into the fore the issue of exposing
retail debt holders to losses, which are unsophisticated investors with limited di-
versification in their portfolios and in some cases, they are even unaware of their
status as investors and the subsequent risks. The percentage of bank bonds held
by households has historically been high in Italy, partly because of the preferen-
tial tax treatment of interest income on such bonds. Although the protection of
retail debt holders is not a resolution objective, unless regarded as a critical func-
tion, a potential exposure of such holders to losses may have contagion effects
(for example, resulting in a bank run) or be politically sensitive (for example, af-
fecting their pensions). The measures taken in the context of the four resolutions
were designed with a view to protecting senior retail bond holders. This required
higher contributions by the resolution fund, which, given that it had not met the
target level required under the BRRD by that time, borrowed the funds needed
from the three biggest Italian banks (Unicredit, Intesa and UBI).66,67
The four banks were very small, accounting for only 1% of total deposits in Italy.
In more detail:
Banca delle Marche was active in the Marche region and in other areas of Central
Italy: Umbria, Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Abruzzo and Molise via a network of 308
branches. The bank’s business model was focused on lending to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and retail clients. According to the latest published figures
at the end of 2012, Banca Marche had total assets of e22.7 billion, net customer
loans of e17.3 billion and deposits of e7.2 billion. The bank had been placed under
special administration on 15 October 2013.
Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio was listed on the Italian stock exchange
and operated mainly in Tuscany and Central Italy. It had a network of 175 branches
and conducted a business focused on lending to SMEs and retail clients. According
to the latest published figures of 30 September 2014, the group had total assets of
e12.3 billion, net customer loans of e6.1 billion and deposits of e6.4 billion. The
bank had been placed under special administration on 10 February 2015.
Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara was a regional bank the business of which was
focused on lending to SMEs and private clients with funding mainly from retail cus-
tomers. It operated with 106 branches in the geographical area around Ferrara. Ac-
cording to latest published figures at the end of 2012, the group had total assets of
e6.9 billion, net customer loans of e4.6 billion and deposits of e3.4 billion. The
bank had been placed under special administration on 27 May 2013.
Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti was a medium-sized regional bank
with a focus on the Italian region of Abruzzo with a traditional business focused on
lending to SMEs and retail clients. According to the latest published figures at the end
66Under the BRRD, a contribution by the resolution fund is only possible if 8% of the institution’s liabili-
ties have first been exposed to losses. The BRRD gave Member States the flexibility to apply this provision
from 2016, hence at the time of the resolution of the four banks the 8% rule was not applicable in Italy.
67Merler [5].
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of 2013, the bank had total assets of e4.7 billion, e2.1 billion of net customer loans
and deposits of e2.5 billion. The bank had been placed under special administration
on 5 September 2014.68
(D) Banko Espirito Santo (BES), the third largest bank in Portugal, was resolved
in August 2014, prior to the transposition deadline of the BRRD of end of De-
cember 2014. The Portuguese legislation in force at the time was, however, to a
large extent consistent with the international standards on resolution, including
the main resolution objectives and principles as were subsequently articulated
in the BRRD. BES had a market share of around 11.5% of total deposits and
belonged to an international financial group (Grupo Espirito Santo-GES), which
had operations in 25 countries and was active in both the financial and non-
financial sectors. The bank was, thus, significant for domestic financial stability
and financial stability of other relevant countries, and a possible disruption in its
critical functions could have had systemic implications.
The resolution process involved the transfer of the majority of the bank’s activity
to a bridge bank, Novo Banco, the capital of which was formed through contributions
by the resolution fund. Due to the resolution fund having insufficient financial means,
it borrowed the required amount from the Portuguese State and a consortium of banks
that were members of the resolution fund. The residual part of BES was placed into
liquidation in July 2016.69
Save for the last case of the resolution of the third largest bank in Portugal, it is
questionable whether the EU legislator was targeting the other cases, when articu-
lating the regulatory assessments that are focusing on the likely impact of failure on
financial stability. The resolution of a ‘wind-down’ asset management vehicle or a
small cooperative bank being in the public interest, having regard to the resolution
objectives, merits the question of whether the public interest test is in fact fit for pur-
pose. A potential solution may well be having no such ‘threshold’ or ‘safeguard’,
and relying on resolution being the default option at all times. This solution would
not be dissimilar from the US case, where there is no equivalent assessment to the
public interest test and the resolution authority for federally insured deposit-taking
institutions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), seeks to resolve fail-
ing institutions in all cases. The most common resolution tool is the purchase and
assumption transaction (P&A); if the FDIC does not receive a P&A bid by private
sector purchasers that meets the objective of the ‘least cost resolution’,70 it reim-




70With the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991, the
FDIC amended its resolution procedures in an effort to decrease the costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund
(DIF). These new procedures require the FDIC to choose the bid that is the least costly resolution to the
DIF when resolving a failing institution. Prior to the passage of the FDICIA, the FDIC was not required
to use the least costly bid and could pursue any resolution alternative as long as it was less costly than
liquidation.
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2.4 ‘Financial stability’ in the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation
Regulation 806/2014 (SRMR)71 established the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and
the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), the second pillar of the European Banking Union,
comprising centralised supervision, a centralised resolution regime including a cen-
tralised resolution fund and, potentially in future, a centralised deposit protection
scheme. The SRMR centralizes resolution decision-making within the Eurozone un-
der the aegis of the SRB, but relies on national resolution authorities to help prepare
and execute those decisions. The SRB is also in control of the SRF, which mutualises
contributions by national banking sectors and ensures the availability of medium-
term funding support, if required, after shareholders and creditors have been exposed
to losses to a minimum level.
The SRMR is consistent with the BRRD; it however adapts the rules and principles
of the BRRD to the specificities of the SRM and ensures that appropriate funding is
available to the latter.72 To achieve a centralised application of the resolution rules
by a single authority and avoid divergent interpretations among Member States, the
SRM has been established in the form of an EU Regulation, directly applicable in
the participating Member States. As a result, the wording of some of the BRRD
provisions has been amended to meet those needs.
As to financial stability, the SRMR clarifies from the outset that, as a general
principle, when the SRB, Council, Commission or a national resolution authority is
making decisions or taking action which may have an impact in more than one Mem-
ber State, and in particular when taking decisions concerning groups established in
two or more Member States, due consideration must be given to “the interests of the
Member States where a group operates and in particular the impact of any decision or
action or inaction on the financial stability, fiscal resources, the economy, the financ-
ing arrangements, the deposit guarantee scheme or the investor compensation scheme
of any of those Member States and on the Fund”.73 Accordingly, the group resolution
plan drawn up by the SRB must take into account the impact on financial stability in
all Member States concerned.74
In the SRMR, the resolution objectives remain unchanged with the exception of
that pertaining to financial stability, where the wording has been slightly modified:
under the BRRD resolution authorities must have regard to the need “to avoid a sig-
nificant adverse effect on the financial system”,75 whereas in the SRMR the objective
is “to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability”.76 It is likely that the
spirit of the two provisions is identical; any differences in the wording are however
suboptimal as they could create ambiguity.
71Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establish-
ing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment
firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 225/1.
72Recital 18 to the SRMR
73Art. 6 (3) of the SRMR.
74Art. 8 (11) of the SRMR.
75Art. 31 (2) (b) of the BRRD.
76Art. 14 (2) (b) of the SRMR.
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When assessing an institution’s eligibility for simplified obligations, “the Board
shall conduct an assessment of the institution or group concerned and shall apply
simplified obligations, if the failure of the institution or group is not likely to have
significant adverse consequences for the financial system or be a threat to financial
stability”.77
In the context of the resolvability assessment, the SRMR provides that “significant
adverse consequences for the financial system or threat to financial stability refers to a
situation where the financial system is actually or potentially exposed to a disruption
that may give rise to financial distress liable to jeopardise the orderly functioning,
efficiency and integrity of the internal market or the economy or the financial system
of one or more Member States. In determining the significant adverse consequences
the Board shall take into account the relevant warnings and recommendations of the
ESRB and the relevant criteria developed by EBA in considering the identification
and measurement of systemic risk”.78 Equally, in identifying measures to address
impediments to an institution’s resolvability, “the Board shall take into account the
threat to financial stability of those impediments to resolvability and the effect of the
measures on the business of the institution, its stability and its ability to contribute
to the economy, on the internal market for financial services and on the financial
stability in other Member States and the Union as a whole”.79
As can be seen from the foregoing, certain definitions or concepts entailed in key
regulatory assessments have been articulated in a different manner in the SRMR com-
pared to the BRRD. Although this inconsistency can be justified to a certain extent in
light of the different legal instruments (i.e. one being a Regulation with direct effect
and the other a minimum harmonising Directive applicable only once transposed into
national law), it may lead to ambiguity. Such ambiguity will be particularly challeng-
ing in cases where the SRB will be applying binding technical standards developed
by the European Banking Authority (and adopted by the European Commission) on
the basis of the BRRD and not the SRMR.80
3 Conclusion
All of the decisions of the resolution authorities, from resolution planning to resolu-
tion execution, are necessarily based on broad notions with a central one being that of
protection of financial stability. In particular, resolution authorities in fulfilling some
of their key obligations under the BRRD and SRMR must assess the likely impact of
the institution’s failure on domestic financial stability as well as on financial stability
of other Member States in the case of groups operating across borders. It is necessary
for the resolution authorities to have sufficient flexibility to be in a position to effect
an orderly resolution as quickly as is necessary. At the same time, it is also impor-
tant for this flexibility to be constrained so as to provide certainty to the institutions’
77Art. 11 (3) of the SRMR.
78Art. 10 (5) of the SRMR.
79Art. 10 (10) of the SRMR.
80Art. 5 (2) of the SRMR.
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stakeholders (e.g. bondholder, depositors, FMIs etc) on the parameters around which
the resolution authorities’ decisions will be made.
One example of such limitation is the five resolution objectives that should guide
the resolution authorities’ actions and should serve as a justification to any interfer-
ence in property rights where creditors or shareholders are affected by the exercise
of the resolution powers. The resolution objectives are, however, too broad to ensure
convergence of practices in the EU. As a result, it is unclear whether a bank with a
small balance sheet size or limited interconnectedness could have a significant ad-
verse effect on domestic financial stability if it failed or it is only bigger banks in size
or more interconnected banks that could have an adverse effect on financial stabil-
ity. The answer will also depend on the wider macro-economic or institution-specific
circumstances at the time of failure or may be defined by reference to normal insol-
vency proceedings: if the insolvency process is lengthy and complex, it may have a
significant adverse effect on domestic financial system, hence justifying intervention
by resolution authorities in most cases.
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